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A CONSIDERATION OF DAVID LEWIS’ 
NOTIONS OF CONTINGENCY IN 
RELATION TO HIS THEORY OF POSSIBLE 
WORLDS 
 
Sarah Alberstein 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 In this paper, I will consider the tensions raised by the 
relationship between David Lewis’ notions of contingency and his 
Theory of Possible Worlds.  I first argue that both of these 
components are necessary facets of Lewis’ theories. I will then argue 
that in order to maintain causal isolation in his Theory of Possible 
Worlds and his understandings of contingency, specifically that 
contingent knowledge requires causal interaction to be known, Lewis 
is limited to language which only employs existentially quantified 
description. Lewis takes possible worlds to be beyond our physical 
realm, and so there is no causal interaction between our world and 
possible worlds. Yet, Lewis’ theory of contingency requires both that 
we have an insight into possible worlds and that we have a causal 
interaction with them. I conclude that this limitation reduces the 
potency of Lewis’ theory overall as it prevents Lewis from using 
vivid, descriptive terms which can be imagined, understood, or 
perceived.  
 
Introduction 
 
In his theory of possible worlds, David Lewis emphasizes the 
non-existence of any causal relationships between worlds. This lack 
of causality constitutes a fundamental piece of Lewis’ definition of 
possible worlds. Lewis also makes clear that a person existing in one 
particular possible world is able to know of an entirely different 
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possible world. The relationship between knowledge and causal 
isolation, and the metaphysical results these concepts yield, pose a 
potential threat to Lewis’ theory. This paper will proceed by 
examining this relationship, considering the ways in which Lewis has 
previously addressed related objections, and then giving a response to 
Lewis’ treatment of such objections. 
 
The Benefit of Causal Isolation between Possible Worlds 
 
 In Lewis’ theory of possible worlds he states, “[possible worlds] 
are isolated: there are no spatiotemporal relations at all between 
things that belong to different worlds. Nor does anything that 
happens at one world cause anything to happen at another. Nor do 
they overlap; they have no parts in common…”1 This piece of Lewis’ 
definition of possible worlds characterizes those worlds as entirely 
isolated from one another. Importantly, Lewis notes the lack of 
causality between worlds. This lack of causality plays an important 
role in Lewis’ theory as it prevents philosophically toxic self-
causation. According to Thomas Morris, “the very idea of self-
causation… is almost universally characterized as absurd, incoherent, 
or worse.”2 Lewis writes “if worlds are causally isolated, nothing 
outside a world ever makes a world; and nothing inside makes the 
whole of a world, for that would be an impossible kind of self-
causation.”3 This is to say that a possible world’s existence is just so – 
there is nothing within or outside of that world which ignites its 
existence. By removing causal relationships between worlds, and thus 
removing the possibility of self-causation, Lewis avoids potential 
absurdity or incoherence in his theory. In this way, lack of trans-
world causation is an essential piece of Lewis’ Theory of Possible 
Worlds. 
 
The Necessity of Knowledge of Other Possible Worlds 
 
 A second essential piece of Lewis’ Theory of Possible Worlds is 
the ability of individuals existing in one possible world to know of 
other possible worlds. Not only is this piece essential, but it is also 
constantly exhibited by the very existence of the theory itself. To 
deny the knowledge of other possible worlds is a direct affront to the 
existence of the theory; as it is the case that in order to understand or 
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even comprehend Lewis’ theory, one must be able to conceive of 
other possible worlds. It is impossible to deny the ability to know of 
possible worlds while simultaneously interpreting Lewis’ theory in 
any capacity or fashion. More pointedly, it would be impossible for 
Lewis to even put forth his Theory of Possible Worlds if he denied 
the ability of people existing in possible worlds to know of other 
worlds. Therefore, to deny this ability yields yet another absurdity. So, 
in addition to the lack of a causal relationship between worlds, Lewis 
must also accept knowledge of other worlds. 
  
Benecerraf’s Dilemma 
 
 Each of these components of Lewis’ Theory of Possible Worlds 
are essential to this theory. To deny either would yield absurdity and 
thus invalidate Lewis’ entire theory as a whole. However, it seems 
that the combination of these components points to an objectionable 
piece of Lewis’ theory. This objection is motivated by Benecerraf’s 
dilemma regarding mathematical intuition, which is as follows: 
Benacerraf's argument starts from the premise that our best 
theory of knowledge is the causal theory of knowledge. It is 
then noted that according to platonism, abstract objects are 
not spatially or temporally localized, whereas flesh and blood 
mathematicians are spatially and temporally localized. Our 
best epistemological theory then tells us that knowledge of 
mathematical entities should result from causal interaction 
with these entities.4 
This argument puts forth the premise that the relationship between 
spatiotemporally located mathematicians and abstract, non-
spatiotemporally located mathematical concepts must be a causal one. 
As Lewis puts it in his restatement of the objection, “the trouble is 
that knowledge requires some sort of causal connection between the 
knower and the subject matter of his knowledge.”5 When applied to 
Lewis’ Theory of Possible Worlds, this dictates that in order for a 
‘knower’ (“Person P”) in one possible world (“Possible World P*”) 
to know of the subject matter of a distinct possible world (“Possible 
World R”), there must be a causal connection between Possible 
World P* and Possible World R, specifically between Person P, of 
Possible World P*, and Possible World R.  This poses a problem for 
the causal isolation component of Lewis’ theory as it suggests that 
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Person P existing in Possible World P* can have a causal connection 
with World R. Here, Person P is a ‘member’ of Possible World P* 
and thus can be considered part of World P*. Such an established 
causal relationship between a part of World  P* and an entirely 
separate world, World R, suggests there is at least some degree of 
causality between Possible World P* and Possible World R.  
 
Lewis’ Response to Benecerraf’s Dilemma 
 
 Lewis responds to this objection by further considering the 
relationship between spatiotemporally located individuals and non-
spatiotemporally located mathematical concepts. Lewis states,  
Even if there does turn out to be some ontologically innocent 
way to understand mathematics, still we have judged…that 
we did not require any such thing before we could have 
mathematical knowledge; we would have had mathematical 
knowledge even if it had been knowledge of a causally 
inaccessible realm of special objects.6 
In this piece of text, Lewis suggests that to be outside of the realm of 
direct inspection constitutes causal isolation. Here, direct inspection 
is taken to mean explicit contact with an object. Lewis posits that this 
manner of contact with mathematics is impossible as mathematical 
notions inhabit only a conceptual, non-spatiotemporally located 
existence. However, while mathematical concepts may be outside the 
realm of direct inspection, they are still known. Therefore, it must be 
possible to know at least some non-spatiotemporally concepts while 
simultaneously being causally isolated from them. In order to 
maintain Lewis’ causal isolation between possible worlds, possible 
worlds must also be outside of the realm of direct inspection. 
However, if Lewis’ analysis of causally isolated mathematical 
knowledge is correct, then when applied to possible worlds, this lack 
of direct inspection does not prevent a person in one possible world 
from knowing of another causally isolated possible world. 
 
The Abstract versus the Concrete  
 
 However, it seems that Lewis’ response is not entirely 
satisfactory. Another objection arises which proceeds by 
distinguishing between the abstract and the concrete. There is an 
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obvious and important distinction between mathematical concepts 
and possible worlds - mathematical concepts are non-
spatiotemporally located concepts whereas possible worlds are 
spatiotemporally located regions. This is to say mathematical 
concepts are abstract where possible worlds are concrete.  This 
distinction seems to weaken Lewis’ parallelism between a 
mathematician and the mathematical concepts she inspects, and 
Person P and Person P’s knowledge of Possible World R. One 
cannot reasonably assume that the relationship of concrete to 
abstract (mathematician to concept) is the same as, or even analogous 
to, the relationship of concrete to concrete (Person P to Possible 
World R.) In order to build upon this assumption, one would have to 
provide justification for their parallelism; which Lewis does not 
provide.  
 
Contingent versus Non-Contingent 
 
 Lewis addresses this objection by insinuating that this distinction 
is not a pertinent one. Rather, Lewis suggests that the relevant 
distinction is that between contingent and non-contingent (i.e 
necessary).  Lewis states, “…the department of knowledge that 
requires causal acquaintance is not demarcated by its concrete subject 
matter. It is demarcated instead by its contingency.”7 In other words, 
while there may be some areas of knowledge which are incompatible 
with causal isolation, there are other types of knowledge which 
require no causal interaction whatsoever.  
According to Lewis, the determinant of causal interaction is 
contingency. Lewis posits that contingent knowledge requires an 
element of causal interaction where necessary knowledge does not. 
He uses the example of donkeys to illuminate this claim: 
Our contingent knowledge that there are donkeys at our 
world requires causal acquaintance with the donkeys, or at 
least with what produces them. Our necessary knowledge that 
there are donkeys at some worlds - even talking donkeys, 
donkeys with dragons as worldmates, and what have you - 
does not require causal acquaintance either with the donkeys 
or with what produces them. It requires no observation of 
our surroundings, because it is no part of our knowledge of 
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which possible world is ours and which possible individuals 
are we.8 
According to Lewis, our knowledge of the existence of donkeys in 
our world is contingent and requires a causal relationship with the 
donkeys. This knowledge is contingent because our world could have 
possibly had no donkeys, and this knowledge entails causality because 
we cannot know that there are donkeys in our world until we causally 
interact with said donkeys; even if through simple observation. 
However, the knowledge of donkeys at some worlds is considered to 
be non-contingent modal knowledge. According to Lewis’ Theory of 
possible worlds, there exists a real universe containing each 
possibility. For the phrase ‘donkeys possibly exist’ to be true requires 
the existence of a possible world wherein donkeys exist. It is neither 
compatible nor possible for the phrase ‘there is no possible world 
where donkeys exist’ to also be true. Thus, the knowledge of donkeys 
on some possible world is necessary and does not require any causal 
interaction in order to be known. In essence Lewis rejects the 
necessity of causal interaction in obtaining knowledge of concrete 
objects, and instead puts forth the premise that causal interaction is 
necessary for obtaining contingent knowledge.  
 
The Fault in Lewis’ Distinction between Contingent and 
Necessary  
 
 This response still seems unsatisfactory as Lewis’ response 
relying on the distinction between contingent and necessary seems to 
be incompatible with his discussion of contingency throughout the 
chapter of his book titled Modal Realisms at Work: Properties. In this 
section, Lewis states the following:  
The full membership of [a] set [of instances] does not vary 
from world to world. What does vary from world to world is 
the subset we get by restricting ourselves to the world in 
question. That is how the number of instances is contingent; 
for instance, it is contingently true that the property has no 
instances. Further, it is a contingent matter whether any 
particular individual has the property. Take Brownie, another-
worldly talking donkey. Brownie himself is… a member of 
the set; hence… an instance of the property. But it is 
contingent whether Brownie talks; Brownie has counterparts 
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who do and counterparts who don't. In just the same way, it 
is contingent whether Brownie belongs to the set: Brownie 
has counterparts who do and counterparts who don't. That is 
how it is contingent whether Brownie has the property….. a 
pair may stand in a relation contingently, if it has counterpart 
pairs that do and counterpart pairs that don't…9 
Lewis describes contingency as “what is contingent is the case at 
some [possible worlds] but not at others”.10 This is to say, 
contingency encompasses variation in presentation and instances 
across possible worlds.  
In the case of Brownie, the other-worldy talking donkey, the 
contingency of Brownie’s properties depends on their presentation in 
Brownie’s counterparts in other possible worlds. It would seem then 
that knowledge of Brownie’s properties is a contingent knowledge.  
Thus, based on Lewis’ defense of causal isolation via the distinction 
between contingency and necessity, this contingent knowledge would 
require causal acquaintance or interaction with Brownie’s 
counterparts on other possible worlds to be known. Causal 
interaction with Brownie’s counterparts would violate Lewis’ causal 
isolation of worlds. However, as previously mentioned, Lewis has 
posited that particular features Brownie possesses are contingent, and 
justifies this by appealing to the variation of that feature in Brownie’s 
counterparts.  
In other words, Lewis previously puts forth the premise that 
contingent knowledge requires causal interaction in order to be 
known. In this consideration of Brownie and Brownie’s counterparts, 
Lewis puts forth an additional premise which states that knowledge 
of Brownie’s other-worldly counterparts is contingent knowledge.  
Thus, knowledge of  Brownie’s other-wordly counterparts requires 
causal interaction in order to be known. However, such causal 
interaction would violate Lewis’ principle of causal isolation between 
worlds. Lewis cannot maintain causal isolation between worlds while 
simultaneously claiming that in order to know of Brownie’s 
otherworldly counterparts, one must causally interact with said 
counterparts as such interaction would mandate a degree of 
interaction between worlds. These claims are incompatible.  
 
Questions and Considerations 
 
University of Minnesota  
8 
If Lewis is to maintain his principle of causal isolation, then 
he must reject the necessity of causal interaction in knowing 
Brownie’s otherworldly counterparts. In addition to violating his 
premise dictating the necessity of causal interaction in having 
contingent knowledge, this raises a series of important questions: 
How can Lewis know that these features are contingent if he cannot 
causally interact with Brownie’s counterparts (and thus discover their 
variation across worlds)? If we cannot causally interact with 
Brownie’s counterparts, how can we know any of the features of 
Brownie’s counterparts across worlds? If we cannot know the 
features of Brownie’s counterparts across worlds, how can we know 
that there is any variation in features across worlds? If we cannot 
know that there is any variation of Brownie’s features across worlds, 
how can we know that a particular feature of Brownie’s is a 
contingent feature? Each of these questions point to a seemingly 
irreconcilable tension between causal isolation and Lewis’ proposed 
notions of contingency. In considering these relevant components of 
David Lewis’ notions of contingency, and his Theory of Possible 
Worlds, it is impossible to know anything about Brownie the talking 
donkey contingently. Thus, David  Lewis’ Theory of Possible Worlds 
must proceed without dependence on the example of Brownie the 
talking donkey, or any other analogous object, to illustrate his claims.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In removing the applicability to specific otherworldly objects, 
Lewis limits the scope of understanding to include only purely 
abstracted examples. Thus, Lewis is only able to discuss things of 
which we have no capacity to imagine, understand, or perceive.  In 
other words, Lewis’ possible worlds are not imaginable and carry no 
tangible understanding. While this response fortifies the compatibility 
between Lewis’ notions of contingency and his Theory of Possible 
Worlds, it limits the scope of understanding in the process.  This, in 
turn, reduces the pungency of Lewis’ theory as it sacrifices practical 
tangibility.  While this response is philosophically and logically sound, 
Lewis must consider to what degree this lack of concrete 
understanding and applicability weakens the force of his arguments 
overall.  
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In Defense of the Transmission Model of 
Testimonial Knowledge 
 
By Androw Ebrahem 
 
I. Introduction 
One way we come to acquire knowledge is through 
testimony. Usually, this is thought of in terms of knowledge being 
transmitted from person A to person B. But, in order for something 
to be transferred from A to be B, A must be in possession of it. 
Under this transmission model of testimonial knowledge, two 
conditions must be satisfied: “(1) that hearers can acquire knowledge 
via the testimony of others; and (2) that speakers must themselves 
have the knowledge in question in order to pass it to their hearers.”1 
Jennifer Lackey argues that this transmission model of testimonial 
knowledge is mistaken. According to her, a hearer can come to know 
that p, even if the testifier does not know that p. She does this by 
giving us cases where she believes a person A comes to know that p 
through the testimony of person B, where B lacks the knowledge that 
p. This implies that testimonial knowledge is not merely transferrable 
but is also generative. So, it is possible for testimonials to generate 
knowledge in person B which is not in person A. My purpose in this 
paper is to show that these cases fail to adequately show that 
transmission of knowledge can be generative. Rather, I will argue that 
all Lackey can show is that transmission is generative of justified true 
belief. 
II. Lackey’s Argument 
                                                
1. Jennifer Lackey. "Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission." The Philosophical 
Quarterly 49, no. 197 (October 1999): 471, 
http://www.jstor.org.ezp3.lib.umn.edu/stable/2660497. 
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Lackey’s main aim is to show that someone might testify to 
knowledge which he lacks. In order to do this, she has to disprove 
the two claims of knowledge as transmission. The first is “(2) For 
every speaker S and hearer H, if H comes to know that p via S’s 
testifying that p, then S must know that p.”2 That is to say, if John 
will come to know that there is no longer any milk in the fridge 
through the testimony of Mary, then it is necessary for Mary to also 
know that there is no milk in the fridge. This claim, however, is too 
strong. There is a second claim (2*), which is weaker than (2): “For 
every testimonial chain of knowledge C, in order for a hearer H in C 
to come to know that p via the testimony of a speaker S in C, at least 
the first speaker S 1 in C must know that p (in some non-testimonial 
way).”3 Under this view, Mary does not herself need to know that 
there is no milk in the fridge, but, in order for her testimony to be 
knowledge she must have been told by someone else who does know 
that there is no milk in the fridge. For the sake of this paper, I want 
to focus on how Lackey tries to show that (2*) is false. 
If Lackey is to show that (2*) is false, then she must show 
how it is possible for someone in a chain of testimony to gain 
knowledge even if the first person in the chain does not have 
knowledge. Lackey’s definition of knowledge is “S knows that p iff (i) 
p; (ii) S believes that p; (iii) S is justified in believing that p.”4 So, a 
person counts as not knowing that p if p is not true, he lacks a belief 
in p, or if he is not justified in believing that p. According to Lackey, 
a necessary condition for testimonial knowledge is that “the hearer 
must not have any defeaters for S’s report that p.”5 For the purpose 
of this paper, I want to focus on what Lackey calls doxastic defeaters. 
A doxastic defeater (henceforth defeater) is a “proposition D 
which is believed by S to be true, yet indicates that S’s belief that p is 
either false or unreliably formed or sustained.”6 A doxastic defeater is 
                                                
2. Lackey, 473.  
3. Lackey, 473.  
4. Lackey, 473.  
5. Lackey, 474.  
6 Lackey, 474. 
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thus a belief which one holds that undermines a different belief. For 
example, suppose I see a giant pink zebra and form the belief (p) “I 
see a giant pink zebra in the room”. However, what is said can also 
apply to other defeaters. See the other two defeaters and how they 
function. Suppose also that I have the belief (D) “I am hallucinating.” 
Here D functions in such a way as to make me not believe that p. 
The important thing to note here is that D does not have to be true 
in order for it to be a successful defeater. Regardless of whether or 
not I actually took the hallucinogen, if I believe that I did, that belief 
defeats my belief that p. 
 With that in mind, let us proceed to Lackey’s first example. 
The example asks us to imagine someone, let us call him Thomas, 
who is grappling with a skeptical worry. He is wondering whether he 
is actually a brain in a vat, hooked up with wires to get this perceptual 
world which is all a figment of his imagination. Suppose that Thomas 
cannot rule out whether he is a brain in a vat and as a result proceeds 
to believe that he is indeed a brain in a vat. This skeptical worry, thus, 
led to a belief that undermines his belief in an external world. And if 
he does not believe that the external world exists, then Thomas does 
know that the external world exists. 
Now suppose that Thomas is sitting in the park as he is 
contemplating this external world skepticism further. He is then 
approached by Ruth who is seeking information about the closest 
restaurant to the park. She proceeds to ask Thomas and he tells her 
that the restaurant is around the corner. Now let us assume that the 
restaurant is in fact around the corner. Thomas relays his belief 
regarding the location of the restaurant to Ruth but does not tell her 
about his belief that he is a brain in a vat. This means that Ruth does 
not get the belief that serves as a defeater for Thomas. Furthermore, 
let us also assume that Ruth has good reason to believe Thomas’ 
testimony is true. Perhaps she knows from experience that when she 
asks people for direction they usually give her correct information. 
This means that Ruth is justified in believing that the restaurant is 
around the corner. So, Ruth forms the justified true belief that the 
restaurant is. For remember, in order for him to know that the 
external world exists, a necessary condition is that he must also 
believe that it does exist around the corner. This, according to 
Lackey’s definition of knowledge is enough to allow us to claim that 
Ruth knows where the restaurant is. Now, remember, the reason why 
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Thomas failed to have knowledge is because his belief that he is a 
brain in a vat served as a defeater of his belief in an external world. 
And, if he fails to believe that the external world exists, he fails to 
know that it exists; and by extension also fails to know that the 
restaurant is around the corner. Ruth, however, does not possess the 
defeater that Thomas has. And thus, she has knowledge of where the 
restaurant is. And she attained this knowledge through the testimony 
of Thomas. The strength of Lackey’s example is that she shows how 
a “speaker can have doxastic defeaters which hearers do not have.”7 
And, since the hearer fails to have the defeater, they can come to 
know that p while the testifier fails to know that p. Furthermore, this 
works in a chain of testimony. For suppose Ruth finds someone else 
on the road, Philip, who is also asking for the closest restaurant and 
she directs him. She would be giving him knowledge of where the 
closest restaurant is, and both Philip and Ruth would know the 
location of the closest restaurant while Thomas fails to know. 
III. Gettier Cases 
Lackey’s example would have been able to show that 
testimony is generative of knowledge were it not for the Gettier 
problem. Gettier was able to show how knowledge must be more 
than merely a justified true belief. To see how Gettier cases work, he 
asked us to suppose that two people, Smith and Jones, are 
interviewing for a job. Suppose that the hiring manager said in front 
of Smith that Jones will get the job. Now, before entering the 
company, Jones has seen that Smith has ten coins in his pocket. So, 
based on the word of the hiring manager, Mark forms the belief that 
the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. He is 
justified in believing this since Jones does have ten coins in his 
pocket. Suppose further than unbeknownst to Smith, he himself had 
ten coins in his pocket, and he is the one who gets the job. It seems 
then that Smith had a justified true belief that failed to be knowledge. 
It was true that the person getting the job had ten coins in his pocket. 
And, Smith was justified in believing that the person getting the job 
will have ten coins in his pocket. However, Smith’s belief that the 
person getting the job will have ten coins in his pocket was not based 
on a correct inference. It was based on his belief that Jones will get 
the job, when in fact Smith is the one that got the job. And, it was 
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unknown to Smith that he himself had ten coins in his pocket. 
IV. Lackey’s Gettier Transmission 
Now, the question we have to ask is whether Ruth comes to 
have knowledge that the restaurant is around the corner when 
Thomas tells her so. I will argue that she fails to know because the 
testimony given by Thomas is a Gettier-like testimony and thus is not 
enough to be knowledge. To do this, I will show that it is merely an 
accident that Ruth’s justified true belief, which she gained from the 
testimony of Thomas, is correct. To illustrate this point, suppose you 
are sick and you go to the doctor. The doctor without reading your 
charts or asking you any questions, tells you that you have arthritis. 
Now suppose you do not know that the doctor did not read your 
charts and so you have strong reason to believe that the doctor is 
correct. Now if in fact you do have arthritis, we cannot say that the 
doctor knew this. But, you are justified in believing that you have 
arthritis, since usually doctors are reliable. However, it would be 
counter-intuitive to say that you know that you have arthritis, event 
tough the conditions of a justified true belief are present, it was by 
mere luck that the doctor diagnosed you correctly. In both cases, of 
the doctor and Thomas, the hearer believes that the person telling 
him is a reliable source, although the source is in fact not reliable. 
This is because a source which fails to know that p, cannot reliably 
testify that p. And even though the hearer has a justified true belief 
that p, they fail to know that p. This is because the testifier’s belief 
actualizes in the real world by mere luck. And as a result, the justified 
true belief that the hearer comes to form is based on luck. To further 
show how this is an example of Gettier, it has to be that Thomas’ 
testimony being true is a matter of luck. For in the Gettier case, the 
person coming to know that p, infers his justified true belief from a 
false premise and it is thus true by luck. The same also occurs when 
the hearer acquires a justified true belief based on the testimony of 
someone who lacks knowledge that p. The fact that Thomas testified 
to the whereabouts of the restaurant, and not to the skeptical worries, 
is itself a matter of luck. This is because it is equally plausible to think 
that he could have chosen to testify to his belief that we are brains in 
a vat. It seems reasonable to imagine a scenario where Ruth asks for 
directions and Thomas answers, “How should I know? We are all 
brains in a vat!” Now, one might push back on this point by saying 
that Thomas’ answer was prompted by Ruth’s question. But, such an 
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attempt, and in fact any attempt to show that Thomas’ testimony is 
not by luck, assumes that he had a reason to testify on the 
whereabouts of the restaurant. But, if he had a reason to pick one 
belief over another then it seems like he had a defeater to the belief 
that we are brains in a vat. Let me expand on this point further. 
Thomas has two beliefs (x) that we are brains in a vat, and (y) that the 
restaurant is around the corner. In this scenario, x acts as a defeater 
for y and thus causes Thomas to fail to believe, and by extension 
know, y. Now, Thomas’ testimony to Ruth could have either been 
due to chance or based on a reason. Suppose one wants to argue that 
Thomas’ answer to Ruth was not based by chance but was prompted 
by her question, or intentionally chosen by Thomas for any other 
reason. If this is the case, that is if Thomas had a reason to choose to 
testify to y and not x, then he must have intentionally chosen to do 
this. But, if he had an intention to report y, then it must be because 
he believed that y is the correct answer to Ruth’s question. He must 
have thought about the question and realized that y is the appropriate 
response. But, if he believed that y is the correct response, then he 
must have also believed that the restaurant is indeed around the 
corner. And it thus seems that a defeater for x, namely the belief that 
y is the correct answer to the question. Now, one might push back 
and claim that Thomas was trying to deceive Ruth. But, if that is true, 
then again Ruth’s justified true belief is based on an unreliable 
premise and is thus based on luck. 
So, in order for the example to make sense, it must be that 
Thomas himself chose to testify that y instead of x based on luck. 
Given that he had ‘access to’ two beliefs, he arbitrarily chose to tell 
Ruth that the restaurant is around the corner, as opposed to telling 
her that we are brains in a vat. But, now if this is the case, then it is 
by mere luck that Ruth comes to believe that the restaurant is around 
the corner. This is because it was just as likely that Thomas would 
have told her his belief that we are brains in a vat. And mere luck 
cannot produce knowledge. So, Ruth justified true belief cannot 
count as knowledge since it being true about the world is based on 
luck. Similar to the arthritis patient who has justified true belief but 
cannot be said to know that he has arthritis, since that belief is based 
on the luck of the diagnosis.  
Now, let us consider a second example. Suppose that there is 
a student named Anthony, who is learning Arabic. Let us assume that 
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Anthony heard the phrase “The kabob restaurant is around the 
corner” in a homework exercise and did not understand what it 
means. So, Anthony decides that he will ask his Arabic teacher what 
it means. On his way to class, Anthony repeats that phrase out loud 
in Arabic so as not to forget it. Now, as he is walking, he is 
approached by a woman who only speaks Arabic. She wanted to 
know where the closest kabob restaurant was. 
So, as Anthony was approaching, she asks in Arabic, “Where is the 
kabob restaurant?” Anthony 
does not hear her, but he keeps repeating the phrase “The kabob 
restaurant is around the corner” 
in Arabic. Suppose that there is, in fact, a kabob restaurant around 
the corner. We would not say 
that this woman knew that there is a kabob restaurant around the 
corner. Although the woman 
comes to have a justified true belief, she cannot be said to have 
knowledge of the location of the 
kebob restaurant. This is because it was due to luck that the 
restaurant was around the corner. In this case, Anthony was not 
intentionally testifying because he did not know (comprehend) what 
he was saying. Yet, the woman comes to have a justified true belief. 
This scenario is the same as that of Thomas. Both testifiers do not 
know, albeit in a different sense, what they are testifying, yet their 
testimony is true. If the woman who speaks Arabic does not have 
knowledge, then Ruth also does not have knowledge. This is because 
the justified belief that they both attain is true by mere luck. 
So, in examples where a speaker does not know that p but a 
hearer comes to form a justified true belief that p, based on the 
testimony of the speaker, the hearer’s belief cannot be said to be an 
instance of knowledge. This is because it is due to mere luck that the 
testimony of the speaker is true. The mere luck of the testimony 
occurs in two ways. The first is that it was by mere luck that the 
testifier testified the true belief and not the belief that served as a 
defeater. And, this is similar to the Gettier case where Smith comes 
to form the justified true belief that the person who gets the job has 
ten coins in his pocket. The second way in which the testimony is 
true based on luck is that since the testifier does not know that p, it 
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cannot be that they are a reliable source. If the person does not know 
that p, and in fact have a defeater to undermine their belief that p, 
they might be in error whenever they testify that p. This is similar to 
the scenario of Anthony who testifies but it is due to complete luck 
that he happens to be true. 
V. Lackey’s Reply 
Now Lackey might push back against these cases being 
examples of luck or examples of Gettier cases. This is because the 
person testifying does not tell the hearer about the defeater. 
However, I would claim that Ruth coming to know the location of 
the restaurant is based on luck in two ways. The first is that it is based 
on the arbitrariness of the decision regarding the content of 
transmission. If Thomas had told her of his skepticism, or of both 
the location and the skepticism, then Lackey would agree that this is 
not an instance of knowledge. In order for the belief that we are 
brains in a vat to undermine the belief the location of the restaurant, 
the two beliefs have to be on the same footing (that is the defeater 
needs to be believed as strongly as the belief that the defeater 
defeats). So, it seems by complete luck that one was transmitted and 
not the other. This is similar to the doctor case, where the diagnosis 
was done arbitrarily. Even if it is true, it is not an instance of 
knowledge. The second way in which this is an example of luck is 
Thomas cannot know the location of the restaurant. So, the 
restaurant being where he actually says it would be is a matter of luck. 
And so, if that is the basis for the justified true belief of Ruth, it 
cannot be said that Ruth actually knows where the restaurant is. She 
has a good guess but lacks knowledge. 
Lackey might reply to Anthony’s case by saying that intention 
matters in testimony. Anthony had no intention to testify, so he was 
not actually testifying and that is why the woman does not know. But, 
if that is the case, then Thomas had the intention of testifying. And if 
we say that, then there must have been a reason he chose one belief 
and not the other. But if there is a reason, as I said earlier then that 
reason would make Thomas believe in the location of the restaurant, 
since it would give priority to the belief of the location over the belief 
in the external world skepticism. But, the whole scenario is built on 
him not believing in the external world, for if he did he would know. 
So, it seems like Anthony’s example is clearly one in which the 
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hearer’s justified true belief cannot be said to be knowledge if the 
testifier does not know it. 
VI. Conclusion 
My purpose in this paper was to show that Lackey has failed 
to argue properly that 
testimony can be generative of knowledge. Lackey’s weakness is in 
thinking that the justified true belief that the hearer acquires counts 
as knowledge. However, she does not acknowledge that it is due to 
mere chance that the testifier is right. As a result, her counterexample 
cases are species of Gettier cases. And therefore, at most, Lackey’s 
argument shows us that testimony can be generative of justified true 
belief, but she fails to show us that it can be generative of knowledge. 
And therefore, I have shown that the transmission model of 
testimonial knowledge should not be disregarded. 
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Relevance Logic: does it capture our informal 
notion of validity and implication better than 
Classical Logic does? 
 
Isabella Carlsson 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 Classical logic has a loose notion of validity: an argument is valid 
so long as it is impossible for its premises to be true while its 
conclusion is false. An argument is thus automatically valid if its 
premises are false. This might seem counterintuitive. Why should 
arguments with self-contradicting premises be considered valid? In 
some cases, this makes sense—but for cases where the self-
contradicting premise has nothing to do with the conclusion of an 
argument, it seems unreasonable to be able to conclude any arbitrary 
proposition validly when a contradiction exists in the premises. 
Relevance logic proposes an interpretation of the implication symbol 
which allows us to formally make more nuanced conclusions about 
arguments containing contradictions. The proposed logical system 
considers some arguments invalid which would be considered valid in 
classical logic. False premises irrelevant to the conclusion are ignored; 
so, arguments with false conclusions (relevant only to other true 
premises) are considered invalid. Adjusting the formal system in this 
way results in a system not only more powerful than classical logic, 
but also truer to our intuitions about validity. This paper argues in 
favor of relevance logic over classical logic for encompassing the 
intuitive concept of validity. 
 
1 .Introduction 
 
Assessing reasoning can be difficult without a formal system. 
Classical logic and relevance logic are two formal systems that use 
deductive logic and attempt to capture our informal notion of validity 
to make inference steps within arguments. Informally, validity is the 
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impossibility of true premises and a false conclusion, where the 
conclusion follows from the premises. The concept of validity should 
identify whether the advancements in an argument are acceptable, 
including steps between conditional statements. We do not want 
conclusions to be derivable by premises that do not support them. 
Relevance logic is more successful than classical logic in capturing 
this informal notion of validity, because it prevents us from labelling 
arguments ‘valid’ which have conclusions unsupported by the 
premises. 
 
2. The Basics of Relevance Logic 
 
In classical propositional logic, the formal validity of an 
argument is represented on truth tables by the lack of rows that 
contain both true premises and a false conclusion. If any such row 
exists, the argument is invalid. What this means intuitively, is that for 
an argument to be valid there cannot exist a possible world where the 
premises of that argument are true while the conclusion is false. 
Possible worlds are defined by the possible combinations of truth 
values assigned to propositions of the argument. For a valid 
argument, no matter how the world actually is, there is no way the 
conclusion could have been false given the premises were true in that 
world. 
 
Relevance logic encapsulates this informal notion of validity 
in its formal notion of validity. However, additionally, the premises 
and conclusion must be relevant to each other. Relevance is 
bidirectional. This means that two tautologies or contradictions 
cannot imply each 
other simply because they are both true, or both false. There must be 
a relevance connection between them so that the conclusion is 
derivable from the set of premises, not merely a relation between 
truth values. Relevance will be defined more explicitly in section 4. 
 
The validity of an argument in classical logic can be 
summarized below. P represents the conjunction of all premises, and 
C the conclusion. The formula below reads “P implies C”. 
 
(.P.→.C.) 
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Classical logic’s implication laws allow the transition to the 
formula below, which reads “either not P or C.” 
 
(.~.P.˅.C.) 
 
 
The interpretation of implication regarding the validity of an 
argument is a material conditional for the classical logician. This 
means the ‘→’ above is equivalent to ‘either the antecedent is false, or 
the consequent is true.’ For Relevance Logic, the ‘→’ in the formula 
above has a stronger meaning than that of a material conditional: the 
conclusion must be relevant for the argument to be valid. 
 
Consider the argument “If Sarah Palin eats gummy worms 
today, then Obama will declare war on Germany.” Assuming there is 
no relatedness between Sarah Palin eating gummy worms and Obama 
declaring war on Germany, this argument is necessarily invalid in 
relevance logic, because the relationship between the antecedent and 
consequent is not one of relevance. Formal validity in relevance logic 
is a stricter notion than that in classical logic. Classical logicians claim 
the argument valid, interpreting the implication materially. In classical 
logic, the argument would 
be valid in the case that Sarah Palin does not eat gummy worms, even 
if Obama did declare war on Germany. Intuitively, though, material 
implication does not capture the relationship between premise and 
conclusion in this example, because what is expressed intuitively 
connotes that there is a relation between the antecedent (Sarah Palin 
eats gummy worms) and consequent (Obama will declare war on 
Germany) of the argument. What we implicitly mean when we state 
this argument is that Obama will not declare war on Germany if Palin 
does not eat gummy worms. Classical logic misrepresents this. 
 
For the relevance logician, implication means propositions 
are relevant to each other in a sense that does not solely depend on 
truth values. Relevance logic allows the formal construction of this 
argument to be labelled ‘invalid’ just in the case that these two 
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propositions do not actually relevantly entail each other, i.e. assuming 
Obama declaring war and Palin eating candy are not relevantly 
related. Classical logic, on the other hand, would not allow this move. 
For the classical logician, even when the two propositions are not 
related with respect to relevance, this form of argument is valid. 
Relevance Logic never allows an argument like this to be named 
valid. 
 
The classical logician might say that the idea behind the 
argument was not expressed clearly in English. While the classical 
logician might adjust conversational language to fit her constructed 
formal system, the relevance logician creates a formal system which 
better corresponds to our informal language. The latter is more 
effective, because informal, conversational language parallels our 
informal notion of validity. 
 
3 .The Degenerate Case 
 
In classical logic, an argument is valid if the premises are 
inconsistent with each other. Relevance logicians disagree; jointly 
unsatisfiable premises should not automatically constitute a valid 
argument. Burgess (2009) calls such arguments, and any implications 
with antecedents that are inconsistent with each other, degenerate 
cases. In classical logic, the system only creates valid arguments in the 
degenerate case. The only cases of invalid arguments in classical logic 
are contained in rows on the truth table which contain only true 
premises. Since the conjunction of the premises is false, there will be 
no case with rows that fit the criteria for an invalid argument. Our 
classical system is useless once an inconsistency in premises exists: it 
is a valid step to infer any arbitrary proposition. 
 
Relevance logic, however, requires the conclusion to be 
relevant to the premises. This means that if the contradictory 
premises are irrelevant to the conclusion, they would be ignored 
while assessing the validity of the remainder of the argument (a 
discussion of the precise definition of relevance is given in the next 
section). This matches informal validity, because an argument should 
not indubitably be considered valid once some implicit premise is 
impossible. The rest of the argument could have nothing to do with 
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the inconsistent premises, but still be invalid. The example of a 
degenerate case below would be valid in classical logic, but invalid in 
relevance logic. In classical logic, there is no necessary relevance 
relation among the premises and the conclusion. In relevance logic, 
there is. 
 
Sarah Palin eats leprechauns 
 
Sarah Palin does not eat leprechauns 
 
Jeb Bush is white 
 
White and Black are not the same thing 
______________________________________ 
• Jeb Bush is Black 
 
 
Intuitively, this argument is invalid, because making the 
inference that Jeb Bush is Black is incorrect, given that Jeb Bush is 
white. The fact that Sarah Palin both eats and does not eat 
leprechauns causes an inconsistency in the premises, making the 
argument valid in classical logic. Whether she eats leprechauns is, 
however, not related to whether Jeb Bush is Black or white. Our 
informal notion of validity tells us that no rational reasoning exists 
between these premises and conclusion, because the relevant 
premises contradict the conclusion, and therefore do not support it, 
which is essential for validity. 
 
There is reason to think a premise unrelated to the 
contradicting premises, yet relevant to the conclusion can contribute 
to meaningful inferences. Here, I assume we consider all premises 
saliently known to us when assessing an argument. Doing so allows 
for the possibility that we assume both a proposition and its negation 
(hence, we assume a contradiction). 
 
One might argue that we do not actually consider all premises 
in the case of contradicting ones, as it would be nonsensical to do so. 
Carrying out this argument only strengthens the reason to favor 
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relevance logic over classical logic. Claiming we ignore nonsensical 
premises either 
means the argument has not been represented properly in classical 
logic or you have already accepted core concepts of relevance logic in 
your formal system. 
 
Say we are reasoning about scientific theories. If a theory of 
quantum mechanics is a premise, for example, along with other 
commonly believed scientific theories, contradictions arise (as 
quantum mechanics does not mesh well with other physical theories 
we have about the universe). If contradictions arise from quantum 
mechanics, however, there is no reason to believe a theory on, say, 
biology should be directly influenced. Reasoning under classical logic, 
any arbitrary theory of biology could be concluded given a set of 
contradictory premises like these. Indeed, false premises validly imply 
any arbitrary proposition in classical logic. Other inferences (like 
those made based on theories in biology), ignoring those related to 
quantum mechanics, should remain intact, and they do with relevance 
logic. 
 
 
 
4. Circularity 
 
The concept of relevance, which is necessary to explicate for 
the use of relevance logic, is based on a criterion called ‘the 
condition of overlapping sets.’ All logics derivable from 
relevance logic require this condition in order for implication 
to hold (Burgess, 2009). This condition is the only way to 
account for propositions related to each other. From it, the 
Craig interpolation theorem can be derived, which effectively 
states that for any relevant implication, an interpolant 
formula, I, exists which is implied by P, and also implies C 
(Burgess, 2009). This just means that for every conclusion of 
an argument, there must be some other formula I which is 
also implied by some of the premises. For the argument to be 
valid, this formula I must also imply the conclusion. 
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The letters in I overlap with those in P and C (Burgess, 
2009). Essentially, P and C represent longer formulas made of 
individual propositions, and they contain propositions in common. 
Without an interpolant I between the premise and conclusion, that 
premise does not affect the validity of the argument in relevance 
logic. Effectively, any single premise that makes up the conjunction 
of premises in P will be ignored in assessing the validity of the 
argument, unless that premise has propositions in common with the 
conclusion. 
 
This criterion for validity might seem to undermine relevance 
logic as a valuable logical system, because the only arguments that are 
considered valid (in any logical system derived from relevance, 
because all require the overlapping condition) are now ones that are 
also circular. If an antecedent (P) can be rewritten to contain the 
propositions already contained in the consequent (C), it seems as 
though the implication has no purpose. If the formula (P.→.C) does 
not tell us anything we did not already know by coming to know the 
formula P, we might think the first statement is redundant or simply 
unnecessary. By stating P, we would already know that C is implied 
by it, so why even state (P.→.C)? 
 
This seemingly redundant relation between the antecedent 
and consequent is made explicit by the interpolant. The interpolant 
expresses that there is a sense in which no new inferences are being 
made as it requires the condition of overlapping sets to hold. 
Essentially, the premises already mean the conclusion in some sense 
when an interpolant exists. This suggests that deductive arguments 
are all circular arguments of some form or another. 
 
The conclusions of circular arguments are merely rephrased 
premises. A simple example of a circular argument would be “I have 
a car. Therefore, I have a car.” A system that only rephrases premises 
seems useless. Circular arguments are, however, valid in most systems 
of logic. 
This is because the reasoning is truth-preserving and irrefutable, 
which are also attributable properties of informal validity. Truth-
preserving arguments have true conclusions whenever their premises 
are true. Irrefutable arguments are those which cannot be proven 
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false. These are both properties of circular arguments since the 
premises are contained in the conclusion. The truth-value of the 
premise is maintained in the conclusion, by deduction, and hence the 
argument cannot be refuted. 
 
The statement below, the archetypal circular argument, is a 
tautology when ‘→’ is read as either material or relevant implication. 
Tautologies are statements which are necessarily true. As indicated by 
the tautology below, they express trivial statements. 
 
(.C.→.C.) 
 
 
Although this circularity problem challenges relevance logic, 
it weakens classical logic just as well. The problem is not specific to 
relevance logic. Logical systems are only tools we use to check 
whether arguments have been constructed deductively. Deduction by 
its own nature cannot make leaps in the sense that other inference 
methods can, i.e. inductive inferences may involve predictions. 
Deductive inferences are only guaranteed to be true because 
conclusions are deductively inferable from premises. In the same way 
that “4” can be derived from “2+2” in mathematics, the conclusion 
“I have a car” is derived from the premise “I have a car” in a 
deductive argument. In both cases, the truth of the conclusion is 
already contained in the premise in some sense. 
 
All logics relying on deductive reasoning can only make 
conclusions based on premises given in an argument or endorse 
syntactic tautologies. This is due to propositions implicitly having 
 
relationships with other propositions, “Mediate Inferences” (Jones, 
1898). This means some premise is suppressed, and an implication 
can be rewritten so to explicitly include the relationship, similar to the 
Craig interpolation theorem. This relationship would thus be implied by 
what formulas represent semantically. 
 
In the degenerate case referenced above, this is impossible in 
relevance logic, because no circularity exists. There is no relevant 
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connection between the false conclusion and either of the 
contradicting premises. Ignoring the contradicting premises, the 
argument is assessed to be invalid. This is why the degenerate case is 
invalid in relevance logic. These degenerate cases are, however, valid 
according to the formal notion of validity in classical logic, which do 
not match our informal notion of validity. Although both classical 
and relevance logic contain circularity, this is not detrimental, because 
deduction should be a tool for working through arguments, without 
arbitrarily coming up with conclusions. A system that validly 
concludes things arbitrarily would be worthless. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Relevance Logic better encapsulates our intuitive informal 
notion of validity. Although the system permits contradictions in 
valid arguments, it allows us to make intuitive inferences which 
themselves do not contain contradictions. Indeed, relevance logic 
allows us to make inferences from an inconsistent set of premises by 
ignoring those premises that are inconsistent. It gives us the power to 
make valid conclusions which are relevant only to coherent subsets 
of premises. Conversely, it also gives us the power to deem more 
arguments invalid than we can with classical logic. By increasing the 
scope of arguments we can judge invalid, relevance logic becomes a 
stronger system. It captures how we would reason through 
arguments in real life and with informal language more successfully 
than classical logic does. 
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Perfection, Error, and an Infinite Will 
 
Chase Pierre Vernard Torrence 
 
 
 
               “There is no excellent beauty that hath not some strangeness in the proportion”  
                                                                 - Sir Francis Bacon 
 
              Perfection, Error, and an Infinite Will 
 
  In this paper, I will investigate René Descartes’ conception of 
freedom in an attempt to clarify his position. Descartes does not 
explicitly outline a doctrine of freedom. Instead, his thoughts on the 
topic are scattered throughout his works, namely, the Meditations on 
First Philosophy, and are mentioned merely as support for his other 
primary doctrines. In part I, I will assess one particular component of 
the contemporary discourse being waged regarding Descartes’ 
conception of freedom. In the process I will determine how my 
thesis can answer some of the questions at hand. In Part II, I will 
assess one particular component of the historical discourse that was 
waged regarding Descartes’ idea of what constitutes perfection and 
his conclusion regarding the source of our error. In the process I will 
determine that Descartes’ conception of freedom places an emphasis 
on the infiniteness of our will, and thereby presents a universe in 
which, counterintuitively, there is greater perfection in the presence 
of error than in the absence of error. 
 
         Part I: Contemporary Discourse 
 
  In “Descartes on Human Freedom” Marie Jayasekera writes that 
Descartes seems to explicitly present his definition of freedom in the 
following passage from Meditation Four. The passage, however, 
raises more questions than answers. 
   
  the will [1] simply consists in our ability to do or not do 
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something (that is, to affirm or   
  deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather [vel potius], [2] it consists 
simply in the fact that       
  when the intellect puts something forward for affirmation or 
denial or for pursuit or   
  avoidance, our inclinations are such that we feel we are 
determined by no external force1 
 
  An immediate question arises from the fact that in the definition 
there are two separate clauses which are not synonymous. The 
question, then, is how exactly are the clauses related to each other? 
The two clauses are separated by the phrase “or rather” which makes 
it unclear as to whether or not Descartes means we should 
understand the two clauses as mutually exclusive, or if Descartes 
means that the latter clause somehow supplements the former. Many 
historians of Philosophy have weighed in with possible 
interpretations, such as suggesting that Descartes may mean “to 
retract or correct the first clause with the second, to add to or to 
clarify the first clause, to suggest that freedom at times consists in 
each, or to make an equivalence between the two clauses”2. However, 
much confusion still remains as to Descartes’ precise meaning. 
  In the first clause, the primary question regards the nature of 
“our ability to do or not do something”3. Jayasekera offers two 
explanations. Either it is the case that “the will can ‘do’ something 
under certain conditions and not do it under other conditions” or it is 
the case that “the will can do something or not do it in the very same 
conditions”4.This question is important because, as Jayasekera points 
out, the first explanation could render a deterministic universe 
whereas only the second explanation could allow for an 
indeterminate universe (i.e. a universe free of determinism). A 
deterministic universe is one in which all of our choices are 
dependent upon, caused by, and a necessary result of those 
conditions. In other words, all of our choices would be inevitably 
determined by those conditions, instead of our being free to choose 
otherwise given the very same conditions. 
  In the second clause, the primary question regards the nature of 
the statement that “our inclinations are such that we feel we are 
determined by no external force”5. Jayasekera questions whether 
Descartes means that “we merely feel we are not determined but we 
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are in fact determined” or that “we are not determined at all”6. 
 Whereas a libertarian conception of freedom is completely 
devoid of determinism, a compatibilist conception of freedom is 
instead compatible with determinism, and we merely appear to have 
free will. Given Descartes’ definition, one of the primary questions 
raised is whether his conception of freedom is libertarian or 
compatibilist. My contention is that we may find our answer if we 
look to Descartes’ emphasis on the infiniteness of our will. 
  As stated in my thesis, Descartes’ conception of freedom places 
an emphasis on the infiniteness of our will. Jayasekera herself notes 
Descartes’ statement that “because of our will and freedom of choice, 
we ‘bear in some way the image and likeness of God’”7,and this 
statement itself indicates that his conception of freedom includes an 
infinite will. The reason why this statement indicates an infinite will 
and the reason why Descartes draws the parallel between ourselves 
and God, by way of our will, is because God is a supremely perfect 
being possessing only infinite faculties, and our faculty of willing is 
significant for the reason that it is also an infinite faculty.  
  Furthermore, in Meditation Four Descartes writes that he cannot 
“complain that the will or free choice…received from God is 
insufficiently ample or perfect, since, [we] experience that it is limited 
by no boundaries whatever. In fact, it seems to be especially worth 
noting that no other things in [us] are so perfect”8. Descartes 
elaborates on this idea by explaining that we can imagine greater 
faculties of understanding, of memory, or of imagination, relative to 
our own limited respective faculties, but we cannot imagine a greater 
faculty of will than our own. “It is only the [faculty of the] will or free 
choice that [we] experience to be so great… that [we] cannot grasp 
the idea of any greater faculty”9While the “faculty of willing” is 
incomparably greater in God than in ourselves, in a vacuum, they are 
both infinite when each is “viewed in itself”10. 
  So, given our possession of an infinite faculty of willing, I 
contend that our answer is that Descartes’ conception of freedom is 
libertarian. In regard to the first clause of his definition, Descartes 
would clarify that his position is the libertarian position that 
Jayasekera offers with the latter explanation. Therein Jayasekera 
writes, “the will can do something or not do it in the very same 
conditions”11.The libertarian position is our answer because a 
universe in which our will is merely a result of being determined by a 
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certain set of conditions is one in which our will is not actually infinite. 
In regard to the second clause of his definition, Descartes would 
clarify that his position is the libertarian position that Jayasekera 
offers with the latter explanation. Therein Jayasekera writes, “we are 
not determined at all”12. This libertarian position is our answer 
because a deterministic universe in which we merely feel that we are 
not determined is one in which our faculty of willing is not actually 
infinite. 
  As evidenced by the abundance of ambiguities in Descartes’ 
definition, much of this debate is spawned by a lack of clarity in his 
writing. In considering these interpretive challenges, Jayasekera offers 
the explanation that intentional obfuscation by Descartes may be in 
play, “he might have been less than candid, or even deliberately 
unclear, to assuage his interlocutors”13. With Descartes’ conclusion 
for the source of all error in mind (which I will explain at the start of 
Part II), I offer that it may instead be the case that Descartes’ 
conception of freedom is made more intriguing simply by an instance 
of error on his part. 
  Perhaps more so than all others in academia, contemporary 
students of Philosophy are expected to maximize clarity in their 
writing, and this is one of the primary criteria for their judgment. 
However, the historical Philosophers being written about present 
perhaps the most notoriously unclear of written works in all of 
academia. While that disparity is ironic, this course of action 
nonetheless seems to be the most reasonable—in the sense that 
contemporary students of Philosophy are tasked with learning from 
and correcting errors of the past.  
  Just as it is the case that contemporary students are liable to err 
in presenting complex concepts as clear as possible, for the same 
reason, the greats that preceded us were liable as well. An additional 
error in the definition that Jayasekera points out is that “both 
affirming and denying are forms of ‘doing something,’ not examples 
of ‘doing something’ and ‘not doing something’… Descartes should 
have said ‘to affirm or to not affirm’”14. (And let us not forget the 
misstatement of “non magis” in Meditation Five.) With clarity issues 
and other such errors in the Meditations abound, and with an excess 
in these two clauses alone, Descartes would perhaps admit that he 
had erred here and that this error was in fact a testament to his 
freedom. 
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        Part II: Historical Discourse 
 
  Indeed, even the father of modern Philosophy is liable to error, 
and as Descartes conceives it, the source of this error is our freedom. 
Specifically, Descartes concludes that the source of all error is the 
conflict between our simultaneous possession of an infinite faculty of 
will and a merely finite faculty of knowledge. In other words, we err 
when we will to do something that our better judgement would have 
otherwise prevented us from doing. Descartes writes, “the source of 
[our] errors… [is] owing simply to the fact that, since the will extends 
further than the intellect, I do not contain the will within the same 
boundaries; rather, I also extend [the will] to things I do not 
understand”15, and that we “make mistakes because [our] faculty of 
judging the truth… is not infinite [but our will to do so is]”16. This 
conclusion is presented in Meditation Four: Concerning the True and 
the False, and it is a self-admitted consequence of human freedom 
(which partially absolves God of any responsibility for our error, 
maintaining perfection of his works). 
  Descartes defines God as a “supremely perfect being”17, and 
Descartes maintains that God and his works are perfect despite his 
creation of a universe replete with imperfect beings who with their 
infinite will may err. Throughout the Meditations, Descartes invokes 
this essence of God and relies on it as the foundation for a number 
of arguments. In the Meditations that bookend Meditation Four, 
Descartes relies on God’s supreme perfection to prove that God 
exists with both the ontological argument (since God is a supremely 
perfect being and perfection includes existence God therefore must 
exist) and the causal argument (the idea of a perfect being could not 
be caused by anything less than a perfect being). Descartes also relies 
on God’s supreme perfection to conclude that God is not an evil and 
deceptive God, writing that, “it is impossible for God ever to deceive 
me, for trickery or deception is always indicative of some 
imperfection [because] although the ability to deceive seems to be an 
indication of cleverness or power, the will to deceive undoubtedly 
attests to maliciousness or weakness”18. 
  The perfection of God and his works is critical to Descartes’ 
project overall. The question then becomes, if God is perfect, 
omnipresent, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, then how can there 
be any room for error in his creation? How is it that God can create a 
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universe that is less than perfect? One answer to this question is in 
Meditation Four, wherein Descartes reconciles the presence of error 
in God’s creation, with God’s perfection. 
  Descartes write that, “in a certain sense, there is greater 
perfection in me in being able to elicit those [errors] than in not being 
able”19.This reconciliation can be summarized as follows. Our ability 
to elicit error is provided by our freedom. Our freedom includes an 
infinite will. The will being an infinite faculty is what makes it a 
perfection. The reason why it is a perfection is because it, being 
infinite, has a faculty that resembles the supremely perfect being, who 
possesses entirely infinite faculties. 
   Additionally, Descartes explains that God works in ways that are 
mysterious to our merely finite knowledge. We can only view parts of 
his works, but we cannot view the product of his works as a whole. 
The parts on their own may be flawed and may elicit error, but in 
considering God’s universe as a whole, to invoke Aristotle, the whole 
is greater than the sum of its parts. Descartes writes, “the nature of 
God is immense, incomprehensible, and infinite… whose causes 
escape me”20. Lastly, while assessing whether or not the works of 
God are perfect, Descartes insists that God and all of his works are 
indeed perfect, and Descartes declares, “we should keep in view not 
simply some one creature in isolation from the rest, but the universe 
as a whole. For perhaps something might rightfully appear very 
imperfect if it were all by itself, and yet be most perfect [as part of a 
perfect whole]”21. 
  Given this insistence, Pierre Gassendi objects to Descartes’ idea 
that the works of God are perfect. In Objections to the Meditations and 
Descartes’s Replies, Gassendi argues that “God could have given man a 
faculty of judgment that was immune from error”22, and writes to 
Descartes, “it is surprising that you should have a true idea 
representing God as omniscient, omnipotent and wholly good, and 
yet observe that some of his works are not wholly perfect. Given that 
he could have made things if not completely perfect then at least 
more perfect than he did make them, this seems to show that… He 
was… somewhat imperfect [and/or] preferred imperfection to 
perfection”23. Gassendi rhetorically asks whether the universe would 
not be more perfect than it is now if all of its parts were more perfect 
than they are now, and suggests that a flawless universe absent of 
error, would be a more perfect universe than one with error. 
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Gassendi likens this to how a hypothetical republic whose citizens 
were all good would be more perfect than one that had some bad 
citizens.  
 
 As a premise, I am working from the assumption that the reason 
error is not present in Gassendi’s hypothetical is because individuals 
are limited by a divine determinism, bound by a rule impressed by 
God which prevents a mistake24, or they otherwise exist in any other 
such way in which there is not an infinite faculty shared mutually with 
God. And, it must also be said that this infinite faculty shared 
mutually with God cannot be intellect because it is “the essence of a 
created intellect to be finite”25. 
   While indeed our infinite will is the source of our error and it 
presents some flaws in God’s creation (Gassendi’s “bad citizens”), I 
must mention that according to Descartes, this infinite will also 
happens to be the sole infinite faculty we share with the infinitely 
perfect being himself. Thus, for this reason, the presence of this error 
as a byproduct of our infinite will is actually more perfect than the 
absence of this error. In Descartes’ immediate reply to Gassendi’s 
hypothetical republic, intimating that an existence entirely complete 
with perfection isn’t actually perfect at all, Descartes writes, “here is a 
better comparison to make: someone who thinks that there oughtn’t 
to have been any creatures in the world who were liable to error (i.e. 
who weren’t wholly perfect) can be compared with someone who 
wanted the whole of the human body to be covered with eyes so as 
to look more beautiful (there being no part of the body more 
beautiful than the eye)”26. 
  In conclusion, on Descartes’ behalf, I offer an additional reply to 
Gassendi’s objection. In reply to Gassendi, a universe would not 
necessarily be more perfect than it is now if all of its parts were more 
perfect than they are now, as if it were like a republic in which all of 
its citizens were good as opposed to there being present some bad 
citizens (error, flaw). The reason for this is because in such a 
universe, since error is not present, an infinite will is not present, and 
thereby, that sole infinite faculty that we share with the supremely 
perfect being is not present.   
  A universe absent of error would merely appear to be a greater 
perfection. It may seem that the presence of error as a result of the 
infinite will is problematic, however, that problem is negligible 
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relative to the invaluable possession of an infinite faculty. That 
infinite faculty is “the supreme perfection of man”27. Overlooking the 
infinite will with which those errors are allowed to be elicited, and 
noting only those particular errors, fails to recognize the most 
significant point. In assessing perfection, the most significant point is 
the presence of a sole infinite faculty in our merely finite being—a 
shared infinite faculty with the supremely perfect being. The presence 
of this infinite faculty thereby constitutes a universe more perfect 
than if this infinite faculty (and the consequent error) were not 
present. So, following a properly conducted audit of the universe, 
assessment of perfection therein, and comparison to Gassendi’s 
hypothetical republic, one may find that the presence of error is in 
actuality more perfect than the absence of error. 
  In considering the alternatives to the particular type of freedom 
that we have, such as God impressing a rule upon our memory that 
prevents us from error, Descartes rejects the prospects of those 
alternatives and writes, “it may somehow be a greater perfection in 
the universe as a whole that some of its parts are not immune to 
error, while others are, than if all of them were exactly alike”28. And 
let us also recall once again what Descartes seems to be echoing, 
which is that, “in a certain sense, there is greater perfection in [the 
individual] being able to elicit those [errors] than in not being able 
to”29. 
  Why is there a greater perfection in the presence of freedom and 
consequent error than in its absence? A variety of complex Cartesian 
notions can be invoked to argue this point. An additional 
interpretation I will offer is as follows. There is a “greater perfection” in 
the literal sense, since, given the presence of an infinite will, there is 
simply a greater quantitative presence of that sole infinite faculty which 
“bears the image and likeness of” God, the greatest perfection 30. 
Descartes’ conception of freedom places an emphasis on the 
infiniteness of our will, and thereby presents a universe in which, 
counterintuitively, there is greater perfection in the presence of error 
than in the absence of error. 
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10. Descartes, René. (1993). Meditations on First Philosophy. 
Hackett Publishing  
  Company. 38. 
11. Jayasekera, M. (2014). Descartes on Human Freedom. 
Philosophy Compass, 9(8), 528. 
12. Jayasekera, M. (2014). Descartes on Human Freedom. 
Philosophy Compass, 9(8), 528. 
13. Jayasekera, M. (2014). Descartes on Human Freedom. 
Philosophy Compass, 9(8), 528. 
14. Jayasekera, M. (2014). Descartes on Human Freedom. 
Philosophy Compass, 9(8), 528. 
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17. Descartes, René. (1993). Meditations on First Philosophy. 
Hackett Publishing  
  Company. 44. 
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What is Epistemically Valuable? The Dubious 
Exclusion of Pragmatic Factors 
in Feldman’sEpistemic Value 
Naomi Kadish 
 
In “The Ethics of Belief” Richard Feldman claims that in order 
for an agent to believe reasonably they ought to form their beliefs 
based on the set of evidence they have at that time. Feldman’s 
account entails that this is the only aspect of the belief formation 
process that has epistemic value. An agent does not need to account 
for things like the accuracy of their beliefs. However, it seems that, 
on Feldman’s view, believing reasonably should include factors 
outside of the epistemic realm. Thus, I will argue that epistemic value 
includes other parts of belief formation. 
Feldman’s project is to give an account of what a person ought 
to believe. He claims that anyone who is in the role of a believer 
ought to follow the available evidence. “These oughts ... are based on 
what’s good performance” (676). We can still determine what a 
person ought to do in a certain role whether or not they have control 
over performing the correct thing. That is, for example, a teacher 
ought to explain things well to their students whether or not they are 
capable of doing so. Similarly, a believer ought to believe certain 
things whether or not they have control over their beliefs. 
1 Feldman first posits about how a person ought to fulfill their role 
as a believer with Principle 1 (PR1). (PR1) For any proposition p, 
time t, and person S, S epistemically ought to have at t the attitude 
toward p that is supported by S's evidence at t (678). PR1 claims that 
a person should believe proposition a if and only if their evidence 
supports it. Though straightforward as a necessary criterion of 
normative belief, Feldman sees PR1 to be overly demanding. As 
Feldman points out, a person would potentially be epistemically 
required to evaluate an infinite number of propositions that are 
logical consequences of a. Thus, Feldman does not want to claim that 
a person ought to believe all of these logical consequences. He wants 
to preserve a person’s cognitive resources (679). Thus, Feldman 
wants a more narrow account on how a person ought to form beliefs. 
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Feldman refines PR1 to Principle 2 (PR2): (PR2) For any person S, 
time t, and proposition p, if S has any doxastic attitude at all toward p 
at t and S's evidence at t supports p, then S epistemically ought to 
have the attitude toward p supported by S's evidence at t (679). PR2 
preserves a person’s cognitive resources. It requires that if a person 
were to adopt any attitude at all toward proposition b they should 
develop a doxastic attitude in favor of b if and only if their evidence 
supports it, against b if the evidence is against it, or remain neutral if 
the evidence is neutral on b. Thus, for Feldman, epistemic value is 
determined solely by whether an agent’s beliefs were formed by 
cohering to their evidence. “Epistemic value”, Feldman claims is, “to 
be obtained immediately from the adoption of an attitude toward a 
proposition. The way to [obtain epistemic value] in every case is to 
follow the evidence one has” (686). Thus, if a person has gained a lot 
of epistemic value, but they have not satisfied the other conditions 
for knowledge, then the person will only have reasonable belief. But, 
if a person has gained a lot of epistemic value and has satisfied the 
other conditions for knowledge (such as truth), then they will have 
knowledge. 
Epistemic value, though, for Feldman, is not knowledge. He 
does not want an account of epistemic value that relies on anything 
besides for what the agent knows at that time. He does not want to 
consider things, like true belief, as epistemically valuable. He does not 
want an agent to be doing a lot of cognitive work to form beliefs. 
Feldman thinks that “we avoid problems associated with identifying 
epistemic value with true belief or with knowledge if instead we say 
that what has epistemic value are rational beliefs” (685). Maximizing 
epistemic value comes solely from forming reasonable beliefs. 
Feldman wants to claim that he doesn’t “see anything epistemically 
good about the person who irrationally gets true beliefs” (686). He 
does not think that utilizing a process that helps you arrive at true 
beliefs is epistemically valuable. Seemingly, Feldman wants to exclude 
true belief or knowledge from the question of what a person 
epistemically ought to do. True belief and knowledge do not 
determine epistemic value. Epistemic value comes solely from an 
agent’s beliefs cohering to their evidence. Epistemic value is 
determined from an internalist justification, not an 
externalist justification. 
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Here, there is some ambiguity in Feldman as to how to 
categorize the belief formation process in terms of its epistemic 
status. He says elsewhere in the article “[a]s I see it, these are 
prudential or moral matters, not strictly epistemic matters” (689). He 
does not want to exclude the belief formation process or the duty to 
gather more evidence from an epistemic calculus, but it does seem 
that he wants to exclude them from epistemic value. What I take 
Feldman to mean is that while an epistemologist can talk about truth 
tracking and knowledge as important epistemic concepts, they should 
be irrelevant to epistemic value. Epistemic value is only grounded in 
belief. “[T]he fundamental epistemic goal is just to have reasonable 
beliefs” (689). One other place that supports my reading of Feldman 
is where he says “[o]f course there may be some instrumental value in 
those true beliefs. They may help the person negotiate the world in a 
better way. But that is a different matter” (686). 
The upshot of PR2, and what Feldman believes a person ought 
to do, can be illustrated by the following cases. In all of the following 
cases there is a nightly three number power ball lottery, with a $35 
processing fee associated with claiming your prize. In the first case, 
David is someone who doesn’t gamble, but likes to know what the 
winning numbers are for every nightly lottery in New York. 
Accordingly, David does not care about what the winning numbers 
are anywhere else in the world and does not form any opinion about 
what the winning numbers are in, say, the Moscow power ball. Thus, 
after reading the nightly power ball report David does not have to 
believe or even consider what the winning numbers were in Moscow 
(or any other non-relevant conjunctions that come with his belief). 
The second case is Christian. Christian, who is also from New York 
and also does not gamble, does not care about what the winning 
numbers are anywhere. He never reads the results of the nightly 
lottery and never forms any beliefs about what the winning numbers 
are anywhere. According to PR2 both David and Christian are doing 
what they epistemically ought to do. Both of these cases seem like 
good ways for epistemic agents to form beliefs that do not require a 
lot of cognitive effort. These cases are good examples of where 
Feldman’s account makes sense 
.Now consider two more cases. In both cases there is 
Samantha: a gambler. In case A, Samantha buys a ticket to the New 
Jersey three number power ball lottery every night. As she’s watching 
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the results on TV, the first two numbers come up and match hers. 
She’s close to winning the lottery and believes that she still may win. 
Additionally, Samantha has heard that it is very likely that, if your first 
two numbers in the power ball match, your third number will match 
as well. However, as soon as they are about to reveal the third 
number of the power ball, her cable goes out. After her cable goes 
out Samantha says to herself, “based on the set of evidence that I 
have now, namely that I know what people say about the probability 
of winning when the first two numbers match and given that my first 
two numbers match, I believe that I have won the power ball”. 
Samantha decides she is going to mail in her ticket and her $35 
processing fee. As she is walking to her mailbox she runs into her 
friend, Olivia, who is also a lottery enthusiast. Olivia, without asking 
Samantha, says “can you believe the last number was 6?” Olivia then 
walks away. Samantha then thinks “now I believe that the last 
number was 6”, realizes she lost, and proceeds to throw away her 
ticket and put her $35 back into her wallet. 
Now consider Samantha in case B. Samantha in case B also 
buys a ticket to the New Jersey power ball every night. She has also 
heard that it is very likely that, if your first two numbers in the power 
ball match, your third number will match as well. As she’s watching 
the results on TV, the first two numbers come up and match hers. 
Samantha says to herself, “based on the set of evidence that I have 
now, namely that I know what people say about the probability of 
winning when that the first two match and given that my first two 
numbers match, I don’t need to see the result of the third ball. I 
believe that I have won the power ball.” Accordingly, Samantha turns 
off the TV, and mails in her ticket along with the $35 processing fee. 
Samantha then awaits her prize money. 
There seems to be something off about Samantha in the second 
case. At first glance, Samantha is someone who follows her evidence. 
She frequently acquires reasonable beliefs. In fact, in both cases, 
Feldman would call Samantha a good epistemic agent. In the first 
case, fortunately for Samantha, because she accidently runs into her 
friend Olivia, she acquires better evidence and a more accurate belief. 
In the second case, she does not. For Feldman, we do not care about 
the result in the first case. We do not really care that Olivia happens 
to know the third number and that Samantha ultimately acquired a 
true belief. Samantha was still correct in believing she had a winning 
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ticket, acquires reasonable beliefs, and gets the same amount of 
epistemic value in both cases. However, according to Feldman, in 
case B, Samantha is still doing what she ought to do even though she 
does not attempt to figure out the third number. For Feldman, 
Samantha believes what she ought to believe. Finding more evidence 
does not have give her more epistemic value than she has in case A. 
What is weird is that Samantha, in case B, has the opportunity to 
pretty easily make her belief more valid. After all, her cable does not 
go out. For Samantha, it would make a lot of sense for her to wait 
and see what the third number is. She even knows that it would have 
showed up had she kept the TV on a minute longer. Even with all of 
this knowledge, Feldman wants to claim that she ought to believe, in 
case B, that she would win. 
Why does Feldman want to claim that Samantha, in case B, 
need not keep the TV on for 5 more seconds? This difficulty with 
Feldman’s view can be understood better by looking at what he 
thinks qualifies as epistemic value. Feldman thinks that epistemic 
value is just coherence to evidence. He proposes a synchronic 
account of rationality or what is reasonable to believe. Anything that 
happens over a period of time, for Feldman, is not an epistemic 
question. He classifies these diachronic questions as moral or 
prudential (important yet not epistemic). So Samantha not looking at 
the evidence readily available to her is not a denial of her epistemic 
duty. However, its seems a bit weird that Samantha could have easily 
formed a more true belief and that Feldman does not hold her 
epistemically accountable for this. 
Even though Feldman’s account classifies the reliability of her 
evidence as a non-epistemic factor, he would claim that these other 
factors (the prudential and moral factors) are still an important part 
of the belief formation process. Feldman classifies these other factors 
as morally and prudentially important. Accordingly, he does not make 
the claim that moral and prudential value should be regarded as less 
than epistemic value. He intentionally leaves this evaluation vague. 
He does not think that a moral or prudential ought should determine 
a person’s epistemic ought. That is, Feldman wants to defend the 
claim that there is no meaningful comparison between these oughts. 
Every type of ought (moral, prudential, epistemic) has independent 
value. By separating these oughts he does not need to evaluate the 
prudential value of a person’s action over its epistemic value. 
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Feldman would claim that a prudential evaluation should happen but 
that it should happen independently of an epistemic evaluation. 
I claim that the problem with Feldman’s view is that he only 
considers evidential coherence as having epistemic value. For 
Feldman, no other part of the belief formation process is 
epistemically relevant. However, I think it follows from Feldman’s 
view that when people form beliefs, epistemic value should not be 
fully determined by their beliefs cohering to their evidence. That is, 
within evidential coherence there are moral and 
prudential factors that come into play. I would like to claim that a full 
account of epistemic value should consider the reliability of the 
evidence as epistemically valuable, not just as morally or 
prudentially valuable. 
Thus, even though Feldman seeks to separate moral and 
prudential value from epistemic value, I think Feldman’s proposal 
about epistemic value falls short. It seems apparent that within 
Feldman’s definition of epistemic value there is something prudential. 
Evidential coherence is a prudential act. In order for an agent to 
produce the most epistemic value she needs to cohere her beliefs to 
their evidence. That action is practical. In order for Alice to properly 
cohere her beliefs to her evidence she needs to look at what her 
evidence is. While she may not have a duty to gather more evidence, 
she has a pragmatic obligation to engage in the act of coherence. 
Thus, there is something inherently pragmatic within the realm of 
epistemic value. Accordingly, it seems to follow that simple 
prudential actions, like keeping the TV on for 5 more seconds, would 
fall into the category of epistemic value. I will not enumerate which 
prudential factors would need to be included in Feldman’s definition 
of epistemic value. I will just defend the claim that certain pragmatic 
factors do fall into epistemic value. Therefore Feldman needs to 
defend his exclusion of certain prudential factors from the belief 
formation process any way. 
Feldman claimed that only aspect of belief that has epistemic 
value is evidential coherence. I illustrated through cases 
with Alice where Feldman’s division of value seems to fall short. I 
made the claim that epistemic value inherently includes prudential 
factors and value. Thus, I have shown that Feldman’s account of 
epistemic value should include certain elements that he initially 
sought to isolate as just prudential value. 
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In her first book, Kate Manne (Cornell University) has made a 
significant contribution not only to the philosophical community but 
within public philosophy as well. In Down Girl, she provides us with a 
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brutally honest look at misogyny in our society, endeavoring to 
provide us with a functional and analytically precise definition of the 
concept. Using a series of current events, she exposes both the nature 
and logic of misogyny, demonstrating its perniciousness in the 
modern ‘post-feminist’ context. Though she engages with some 
feminist theory, she primarily brackets the issues of intersectionality 
which often dominate feminist discourse. With the elegance and 
precision becoming of an analytic philosopher, she 
disentangles rhetoric from real phenomena.  
 The first step in her project is distinguishing between sexism 
and misogyny. She broadly defines sexism as “the branch of 
patriarchal ideology that justifies and rationalizes a patriarchal social 
order” and defines misogyny as “the system that polices and enforces its 
governing norms and expectations” (20). In this way, she identifies 
misogyny as a kind of ‘systematic sexism in action.’ One of the many 
advantages of this conceptualization is that it moves us away from 
the idea of misogynist acts as those perpetrated by ‘woman haters.’ 
Instead, it applies to a broader range of actions carried out due to a 
deeply-seated and fundamentally destructive conception of what 
women are and ought to be. She explains sexism as a system which 
constructs men and women in opposing roles with differing sets of 
expectations and responsibilities. Women are expected under sexist, 
patriarchal ideology to provide ‘feminine-coded’ goods to men. These 
include “love, acceptance, nurturing, safety, security, and safe 
haven...kindness and compassion, moral attention, care, concern, and 
soothing.” (110) Most misogynistic acts occur in response to women 
failing to provide those goods to the men who feel they deserve them 
under the sexual hierarchical order. With this systematic view of 
misogynistic acts, she also works against the narrative that much 
violence against women is due to their dehumanization. She notes 
that, on the contrary, much violence against women is due to their 
particular humanness. The ‘feminine-coded’ capacities (as noted 
above) are fundamentally human ones, they are not just valued by 
society but necessary for its functioning. Referencing the popular 
children’s book, The Giving Tree, she illustrates how the logic of 
misogyny positions women as ‘human givers’ and men as ‘human 
beings.’ Women, under this analysis, are ‘the giving she’s’, deliberately 
and systematically cut down much like the fictional tree in a story that 
is both familiar and touching.  
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Manne’s treatment of the all-too-topical issue of misogyny is 
simultaneously arresting, deeply moving, and depressing. She 
provides a framework which not only makes sense of political 
discourse and many current events involving misogynistic acts, but 
also speaks to everyday life as a woman both in broader society as 
well as within the philosophical community. 
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Julian Wuerth, Kant on Mind, Action and Ethics  
Oxford University Press, 2014 
 
 Reviewed by William Marsolek, University of Minnesota  
  
 In his Kant on Mind, Action and Ethics (Oxford University Press, 
2014), Julian Wuerth(Vanderbilt University) introduces a new and 
highly ambitious interpretation of Kant’s theory of the self. He 
argues that Kant held the self to be a simple, noumenal substance in 
an ontologically significant sense endowed with various powers to 
bring about diverse accidents or phenomenal states. This self, or soul, 
is the object of the unschematized category of substance (a being in 
which accidents inhere) with which we have immediate epistemic 
contact by way of simply being aware of existing as an 
indeterminate something in general. This soul is acted on by a 
numerically distinct substance which activates one or more of the 
soul’s faculties or powers to bring about the soul’s accidents. These 
accidents are the phenomenal mental states we experience. For 
example, some noumenal substance activates our soul’s faculty of 
cognition to bring about the predicate of the phenomenon of an 
apple tree. Wuerth then provides a map of the soul by tracing the 
various mental faculties and their interrelations, showing how the 
faculty of cognition delivers spatio-temporal, causally-
connected objects to the faculty of pleasure. This faculty, in turn, 
delivers its pleasurable feelings to the faculty of desire to bring about 
or to sustain this pleasurable object’s existence in experience. For 
example, the apple tree given by the faculty of cognition is delivered 
over to the faculty of pleasure whenever we enjoy ruminating on the 
pleasures apples provide. This pleasure will be delivered over to the 
faculty of desire as soon as we decide whether or how to bring an 
apple into existence in so that we could eat it.  
 In making this argument, Wuerth draws on an impressive range 
of sources: Kant’s Critical and Precritical published works, his 
students’ notes to his lectures on Metaphysics and Anthropology, and 
Kant’s own handwritten notes. He then marshals this picture of the 
soul against a few highly influential interpretive strands, including 
Patricia Kitcher’s functionalist interpretation of Kant’s theory of 
mind and Christine Korsgaard’s ethical constructivist reading of The 
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Groundwork, as well as providing a new backing to his 
characteristically subtle reading of the ‘Paralogism’chapter of 
the Critique of Pure Reason provided in Wuerth’s other works. Perhaps 
his most controversial argument (as if the rest weren’t enough!) is 
that Kant already had the theoretical framework for 
the Wille/Willkür distinction in place well before the publication 
of The Groundwork.  
 While the book suffers from unwarranted repetitiveness and 
some strained interpretive moves, the result is a dense, carefully 
articulated, and wide-ranging marathon of a book. The reviewer is 
not surprised it won the North American Kant Society’s Senior Book 
Prize in 2014. 
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 Raymond Geuss, Changing the Subject: 
Philosophy from Socrates to Adorno  
Harvard University Press, 2017 
 
 Reviewed by C. Alex Jensen, University of Minnesota 
 
 In his latest book, Changing the Subject: Philosophy from Socrates to 
Adorno, ProfessorRaymond Geuss (University of Cambridge) offers 
an ambitious romp through the history of Western philosophy, with 
each of the book’s twelve chapters devoted to a specific philosopher. 
Beginning with Socrates, Geuss traverses over two-thousand years 
of Western thought, discussing the works of Plato, Lucretius, 
Augustine, Montaigne, Hobbes, Hegel, Nietzsche,Lukács, Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein, and, finally, Adorno.  
 Though each chapter has the tone and cohesiveness to be a 
freestanding essay, Geuss’ discussionof these twelve, disparate 
philosophers is held together by the author’s overarching 
questions as to what sort of activity philosophy is, what it is intended 
to do, and under what historical conditions it emerges. “It is my basic 
contention,” explains Geuss at the beginning of the book, “that one 
of the characteristics of philosophy […] is that it generally avoids 
giving a direct answer to a direct question.” Instead, maintains Geuss, 
philosophy changes the question – “andwhat is most interesting to 
observe and most enlightening is to look carefully at why and how the 
question changes” (1). Between the first and second chapters of the 
book, for instance, the characteristically Socratic question ‘What is it 
for a soul to instantiate justice?’ is transformed into 
the macrocosmic question of Plato’s Republic: ‘What is it for a city to 
instantiate justice?’(51).  
 Though one might quibble with Geuss’ characterizations of one 
or another thinker in this book, his attitude towards their thought is 
never cavalier but always careful, nuanced, and charitable. For 
each dubious assertion about some detail of a philosophical view or 
doctrine, Geuss raises a number of insightful questions, highlighting 
the tensions within each philosopher’s work. Often, having laid out 
the project of a philosopher and pointed to its incongruencies, the 
need to yet again change the fundamental question becomes 
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apparent, allowing Geuss to seamlessly transition to the next chapter 
and take up the transmogrified question of a later philosopher.  
Geuss’ twelve chapters have much to offer, his writing being not only 
enlightening and thought-provoking but also engaging, witty, and 
even humorous – it is, I believe, the only work by a professional 
philosophy in which I’ve come across what can only be called a “dick 
joke,” in the form of a euphemistic reference to Alcibiades’ “magic 
wand” (24). The chapter on Hegel includes perhaps the clearest 
explanation of the historical dialectic that I’ve come across (158-60). 
And the chapter on Nietzsche, in which Geuss does an admirable job 
of clearly saying what Nietzsche’s philosophical project is – and, 
equally importantly, what it is not – should be required reading for 
every angsty teenage boy hopped up on energy drinks and the will-to-
power. 
 Like the philosophers he considers, Geuss does not directly 
answer the questions with which he sets out, namely what that set of 
activities we call ‘philosophy’ is and in what historical situations it 
arises. Rather, by the conclusion of the book, Geuss himself has 
changed the subject, instead raising the question whether the 
21st century is a century “after” philosophy, as Hegel maintained of 
the 19th with respect to art. If art, as Hegel thought, “is no longer the 
place where people find their highest needs satisfied and their highest 
interests articulated” (295), might we not say the same of 
philosophy? Just as we no longer bend the knee in the presence of 
the torso of Apollo, though it might still be the object of our 
aesthetic contemplation, so too, suggests Geuss, philosophy “could, 
for one reason or another, stop being important and lose the 
centrality it once aspired to have and laid a claim to” (294). 
Indeed, Geuss suggests that this is the situation in which we now find 
ourselves, at least since 1976 when Heidegger, as Geuss gracefully 
puts it, “finally died” (296). 
 Geuss’ attitude towards the possibility that we are now living in 
an age after philosophy seems to be, at best, one of 
ambivalence: Perhaps, Guess suggests, it was always a myth 
that philosophy articulated our deepest human interests. It’s difficult 
to know what Geuss makes of the purported death of an intellectual 
tradition inaugurated by that self-proclaimed gadfly whose 
“monumentally inventive ways of being irritating” often amounted to 
little more than just being an “intellectual bully” (115-6). 
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 That said, Geuss does not foreclose the possibility that the kinds 
of social and historical conditions under which philosophy thrives 
will reemerge. Indeed, Geuss even predicts this much with respect to 
Heidegger’s later work, in which impending ecological collapse might 
spur a revival of interest. “But,” Geuss is quick to add, concluding his 
chapter on Heidegger, “it seems more likely that the few survivors of 
the imminent catastrophe will have more pressing concerns than 
philosophical texts from the mid-twentieth century” (249).  
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